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Abstract 
The electronic power system can be viewed as a system composed of a set of concurrently interacting subsystems to 
generate, transmit, and distribute electric power. The complex interaction among sub-systems makes the design of 
electronic power system complicated. Furthermore, in order to guarantee the safe generation and distribution of 
electronic power, the fault tolerant mechanisms are incorporated in the system design to satisfy high reliability 
requirements. As a result, the incorporation makes the design of such system more complicated. We propose a 
dependable electronic power system architecture, which can provide a generic framework to guide the development 
of electronic power system to ease the development complexity. In order to provide common idioms and patterns to 
the system *designers, we formally model the electronic power system architecture by using the PVS formal language. 
Based on the PVS model of this system architecture, we formally verify the fault tolerant properties of the system 
architecture by using the PVS theorem prover, which can guarantee that the system architecture can satisfy high 
reliability requirements.  
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of [name organizer] 
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1. Introduction  
Electronic power system is a highly dependable distributed system, where substations, power 
companies, control areas, and interconnection cooperate with each other to generate, transmit, and 
distribute electric power safely. The functional and nonfunctional requirements make the development of 
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such distributed systems complicated. Software architecture is identified as a critical design methodology, 
which can ease the complexity of the development of distributed systems [1], [2]. We propose an 
Electronic Power System Architecture (EPSA) to guide the development of such systems, which involves 
not only different kinds of concurrency but also fault tolerant mechanisms [3], [4].  
Formal methods [5], [6], [7], [8] provide precise speci-fication and rigorous verification for 
architecture design in virtue of well-defined semantics. Prototype Verification System (PVS) [9], [10], 
[11] is a powerful theorem prover with its highly integrated environment for writing formal specifications 
and developing rigorous verification. PVS, built on over years of experience at SRI in developing and 
using tools to support formal methods, has been successfully applied to large and complex application in 
both academic and industrial areas. PVS modeling language expands higher-order logic with a 
sophisticated type system. The interactive theorem prover of PVS offers powerful automatic reasoning 
techniques at low levels such as arithmetic of real numbers and sets. Users can directly control proof 
development at a high level by defining their own proof strategies which combine primitive PVS proof 
commands. These strengths of PVS are useful to verify the fault tolerant properties of electronic power 
system architecture.  
In order to provide precise idioms and patterns to the system designers, we formally model EPSA 
using PVS specification language. Based on the formal model of EPSA, we utilize the theorem proving 
method of PVS to verify the fault tolerant properties of EPSA with high degree of automation.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the construction of electronic 
power system. Section 3 explains the architecture styles of EPSA. Section 4 illustrates the formal model 
of EPSA using PVS specification language. Section 5 presents the verification of fault tolerant properties 
of EPSA. Section 6 concludes the paper.   
2. Electronic Power system and PVS 
2.1 Electronic Power System 
Electronic power system is composed of substations, generating station, power companies, control 
areas, and interconnection. As shown in Fig. 1, the substation and generating station report the demand 
and supply to their parent power company respectively. The power company accepts the data, calculate 
and reports the surplus or deficit to its parent control area. The control area accepts power balances, 
calculates and reports the balance to its parent control region. The control region accepts power balance, 
calculate and reports the balance to its parent inter-connection. The interconnection accepts the power 
balances, calculates, swaps power with other interconnections, and redistributes power interchanges 
amongst its control regions. 
The hierarchical relationship among substation, generating station, power company, and control area 
can be applied to the hierarchical relationship among control area, control region, and interconnection. 
Therefore, we focus our development of EPS on the concurrency among substation, generation station, 
power company and control area. 
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Fig.1 Construction of Electronic Power System 
2.2 Prototype Verification System (PVS) 
PVS is an integrated environment for formal specification and verification. In order to support 
modularity and reuse, specifications in PVS are logically organized into parameterized theories, which 
can be linked by import and export lists. We use a queue example to explain how to build a theory. The 
queue is defined as a THEORY associated with the generic parameter Item. Meanwhile, the TYPE+ 
indicates that the type of the Item is uninterpreted and nonempty. Function Join defines receiving a new 
element item. Function Leave defines leaving an old element item.
Queue [Item: TYPE+]: THEORY  
BEGIN
items: 
TYPE=[#size: nat, elements: ARRAY[{i|i<size} -> Item]#]
itms: VAR items 
nonemptyqueue?(itms): bool=(size(itms)>0) 
nitms: VAR (nonemptyqueue?) 
join(item,itms):items=(#size:=size(itms)+1, 
elements:=elements(itms) WITH [(size(itms)):=item]#) 
leave(item, nitms): items=(#size:=size(nitms)-1, elements:=
(LAMBDA(j:{i|i<size(nitms)-1}): elements(nitms)(j+1))#) 
END Queue 
The theorem prover of PVS maintains a proof tree, and the objective is to construct a complete proof 
tree in which all leaves are trivially true. Each node of a proof tree is a proof goal, which is a sequent 
consisting of a sequence of formulas as antecedents and a sequence of formulas as consequents. As an 
example shown in Fig. 2, the antecedent is composed of two formula A1 and A2, and the consequent is 
composed of two formulas B1 and B2.
Fig.2 PVS Proof Tree Node 
The intuitive interpretation of a proof goal is that the conjunction of the antecedents implies the 
disjunction of the consequents. Users can guide the PVS theorem prover by entering PVS proof 
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commands which can be used to introduce lemmas, expand definitions, apply decision procedures, 
eliminate quantifiers, and so on. 
3. Dependable EPSA 
Fig. 3 Dependable Electronic Power System Architecture 
EPSA is proposed to guide the development of electronic power system with high reliability 
requirements. As shown in Fig.3, EPSA is composed of distributed components:Substation, 
GeneratingStation, PowerCompany, and  Control-Area; share resources: PCDB, and CADB; fault tolerant 
component: CC; and connectors: SPC, PCS, PCG, GPC, PCA, and CAP.  
The distributed component encapsulates its independent data representation and their associated 
primitive operations. Then several distributed components can execute concurrently and corporate with 
each other to cater for the same goal. The share resource is shared by all the distributed components. The 
connector connects the in_port of one distributed component and the out_port of another distributed 
component.  
EPSA integrates fault tolerant techniques with functional aspects at the architecture level to satisfy 
high reliability requirements. Once a local exception is raised in one distributed component, the 
component can call the corresponding exception handler in its own exception context to cope with the 
exception. If this exception cannot be handled successfully, the component should signal a global 
exception and transfer it to the fault tolerant component. When multiple global exceptions are raised 
concurrently in specific distributed components, these global exceptions are passed to the fault tolerant 
component. The fault tolerant component resolves the received global exceptions into a universal 
exception and broadcasts the universal exception to related components and shared resources within a 
network. The informed components can deal with the exceptions based on the integrated exception 
handling mechanisms. 
4. Formal model of epsa using PVS  
The formal model of EPSA can provide precise idioms and patterns to the system developers. The 
distributed components, shared resources, connectors, and fault tolerant components are all formally 
specified using PVS specification language. We take the fault tolerant component CC, and distributed 
component Substation as a snapshot to illustrate the formal model of EPSA.  
4.1 Formal Model of Fault Tolerant Component 
The CC theory describes how the fault tolerant component in EPSA implements the coordinated error 
recovery mechanism when a global exception is raised in an Object or multiple global exceptions are 
raised concurrently in different Objects. This CC theory imports the generic-type theory and the 
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parameterized theory queue. Note that theory queue is instantiated with type OBSTATE. The OBSTATE 
denotes the state of distributed component, either be normal, a local exception, a global exception, or fail. 
CC: THEORY 
BEGIN
IMPORTING GenericType, Queue[ EXCEPTION ] 
except_graph: [items[EXCEPTION] -> EXCEPTION] 
exception: EXCEPTION 
CC: TYPE = [#exceptions: items [EXCEPTION], 
uni_exception: EXCEPTION # ] 
cc: VAR CC 
emptycc: CC=(#exceptions:=empty, uni_exception:=e#) 
ExceptRec(cc): CC=(#exceptions:=join (exception, 
exceptions(cc)), uni_exception:=exception#) 
ExceptGraph(cc): CC= 
 IF exceptions(ExceptRec(cc)) /=empty   
THEN  (#exceptions:=empty, uni_exception:= 
except_graph(exceptions(ExceptRec(cc)))# ) 
ELSE emptycc 
ENDIF 
In the CC theory, the function except_graph is declared to model how to derive a global exception 
from a set of global exception by using specific exception graph methodology. Function ExceptRec 
represents that the fault tolerant Component receives exception from the distributed components. 
Function ExceptGraph specifies that the fault tolerant component uses the function except_graph to set 
the value of the uni_exception when receiving one or more than one global exception. 
4.2 Formal Model of Distributed Cmponent 
The distributed component Substation sends the used and required electronic power data to its parent 
power company. When exceptions raised, the Substation can handle these exceptions.  
Substation[SRSTATE: TYPE+]: THEORY 
BEGIN
IMPORTING CC 
n_states, excepts: setof [ SRSTATE ] 
tsin_ports, tsout_ports: setof [ PORT ] 
dc_msg: [ PORT -> MSG ] 
senddata: [ [ SRSTATE, [ PORT -> AMSG ]] -> 
[SRSTATE ] ] 
except_context: [EXCEPTION -> EH] 
except_handle: [EH -> SRSTATE] 
Station: TYPE = [# inter_state: SRSTATE, checkpoint: 
SRSTATE, ue_rec: SIG # ] 
st : VAR Station 
SendData (st):Station= IF member(inter_state (st),n_states)  
THEN (#inter_state:=PROJ_1(senddata (inter_state (st), 
(LAMBDA p: dc_msg (p)))), checkpoint:=inter_state(st),   
ue_rec:=0 #) 
ExceptPropagate(st):SRSTATE=IFmember(inter_state(st),
excepts) AND ue_rec(st)=0  THEN   inter_state(st) 
ccp: VAR CC 
UniExceptReceive (st, ccp): Sensor=IF uni_exception= 
except_graph(exceptions(ExceptRec(ccp))) THEN 
(#inter_state: =uni_exception, checkpoint:=checkpoint(st), 
ue_rec:=1 #) 
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UniExceptHandle (st): Station= 
IF member(inter_state(st), excepts) AND ue_rec(st)=1 
THEN (IF member(except_handle (except_context 
(inter_state(st))), n_states) THEN  
(#inter_state:= except_handle (except_context 
(inter_state(st))), checkpoint: = inter_state(st), ue_rec:=0 #) 
ELSIF 
except_handle(except_context(inter_state(st)))=Fail  
THEN (#inter_state:=Fail, checkpoint:=inter_state(st), 
ue_rec:=0 #) 
END Subsation 
In the Substation theory, the function SendData sends the electronic power data to the power company 
via connectors. When the Substation raises a global exception, the function ExceptPropagate is used to 
propagate the raised exception to the fault tolerant component. The function UniExceptReceive specifies 
when the distributed component receives a universal exception (uni_exception) from the fault tolerant 
component, the state of Substation (inter state is updated to uni_exception and signal ue_rec is updated to 
1). Function UniExceptHandle changes the states of four elements in the variable st according to the 
result of exception handling with the universal exception. If the Substation can successfully deal with the 
universal exception by using specific exception handler, denoted as checking whether the execution result 
is one of stable states (n_states), the inter state of st would be set as a stable state, otherwise the inter state 
would be a Fail state.
5. Verification of EPSA using PVS 
Since EPSA is used to guide the development of dependable electronic power system, it is important 
and necessary to rigorously analyze the fault tolerant properties of proposed EPSA. In this section, with 
the help of powerful theorem proving of PVS, we can mechanically verify that EPSA can satisfy the fault 
tolerant properties. The verification about one significant fault tolerant property is presented here to 
demonstrate EPSA can satisfy the high reliability requirements. 
5.1 A Fault Tolerant Property  
When the Shared Resource PCDB is attacked, a distributed component (e.g. PowerCompany) raises a 
global exception PCDBAttacked, then the other distributed components (e.g. Substation) should be 
informed about this exception and deal with it. This property is firstly input to the theorem prover of PVS, 
which is represented as the consequent of a sequent, as shown below. 
pcdb_ pred1 : 
|------- 
{1} (EXISTS (pc: PowerCompany): member (inter_state (sr),  
excepts) AND ue_rec(sr) = 0)  IMPLIES  
(FORALL (ss: Substation), (ccp: CC): 
inter_state (UniExceptReceive(dc, ccp)) = except_graph 
(exceptions(ExceptRec(ccp)))) 
Rule?: (flatten) 
tsft_ pred1 : 
{-1} (EXISTS (pc: PowerCompany): member 
(inter_state(sr),excepts)  AND ue_rec(sr) = 0) 
|------- 
{1} (FORALL (ss: Substation), (ccp: CC): 
inter_state(UniExceptReceive(obj, ccp)) = except_graph 
(exceptions(ExceptRec(ccp)))) 
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Rule?:
During a proof, we enter PVS proof commands after Rule?, which is prompted by the PVS prover so 
as to interactively verify the property. For example, proof command flatten converts the consequent, 
namely, pred1 ft into a sequent, by eliminating the disjunctive connectives (denoted by IMPLIES here). 
5.2 Verification of Fault Tolerant Property 
The PVS proof commands after each Rule? constitute the proof script for the property verification. As 
shown below, the proof script of property pcdb_pred1 starts with proof command flatten, followed by 
skolem! which replaces the existentially quantified variable obj in the antecedent (as prefixed by {-1}) 
with an constant pc!1. 
(flatten)(skolem!) 
(lemma "Propagate")(assert)(skolem!)(instantiate –1 ("pc!1"))
(assert)(prop)(hide -2)(hide -2) 
(lemma "Propagate")(assert)(skolem!)(instantiate -1("coc!1"))
(assert)(prop)(hide -3)(hide -3) 
(lemma "ExceptPropagate")(instantiate -1 ("pc!1")) 
(replace -1 (-1 -3) rl)(hide -1) 
(lemma "NonEmpty")(instantiate -1 ("ccp!1" "pc!1"))  
(lemma "CCReceive")(instantiate -1 ("ccp!1"))(assert) 
(lemma "ExceptGraph1")(instantiate -1 ("ccp!1" "ss!1")) 
(replace -1 (-1 -2) rl)(hide -1) 
(lemma "UniExcept")(instantiate -1 ("ccp!1" "dc!1"))(prop) 
(lemma "ExceptGraph1")(instantiate -1 ("ccp!1" "crr!1")) 
(replace -1 (-1 -2) rl)(hide -1) 
(lemma "UniExcept")(instantiate -1 ("ccp!1" "crr!1"))(prop) 
Followed skolem!, there are several user defined lemmas which have been proved to be true. These 
lemmas can induce the property verification until the verification result is true. The strategy of the proof 
is that since the condition of property pcdb_pred1 is that the state of PowerCompany 1) one of the global 
exceptions, and 2) has not received a universal exception from the fault tolerant component, the 
PowerCompany should send such exception to the fault tolerant component. Furthermore, the fault 
tolerant component needs to receive the raised exception. When receiving an exception, the fault tolerant 
component should put such exception into an exception list(exceptions) by using function ExceptRec 
defined in the coordinating theory, Lemma NonEmpty implies that the exception list of the fault tolerant 
component is not empty, denoted as exceptions(ExceptRec(cc))/=empty. When the exception list is not 
empty, Lemma CCReceive is applied to induce the universal exception(uni_exception) which covers all 
received exceptions by using function except_graph, where uni_exception =except 
_graph(exceptions(ExceptRec(cc))). After obtaining the universal exception, the fault tolerant component 
should send it to the distributed component Substation. Lemma ExceptGraph1 indicates that the 
Substation receives the universal exception by using the function UniExceptReceive. By using lemma 
CCReceive, we can get that, inter_state(UniExceptReceive(obj, ccp)) = 
except_graph(exceptions(ExceptRec(cc))),which is the de-duction result of pcdb_pred1. By running the 
above proof script, the PVS theorem prover can verify the pcdb_pred1 property automatically.  
Other fault tolerant properties, such as CADB is attacked, or both PCDA and CADB are attacked, can 
be verified using the theorem prover of PVS.  
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we propose an Electronic Power System Architecture (EPSA) to provide a framework to 
guide the development of dependable electronic power systems. The formal model of EPSA is presented 
472  Ling Yuan et al. / Physics Procedia 24 (2012) 465 – 472
to provide precise idioms and patterns to the system designers. With the help of powerful theorem prover 
of PVS, the fault tolerant properties of EPSA are verified with high degree of automation, which can 
demonstrate the proposed EPSA can satisfy high reliability requirements. 
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